and situs inversus -have all been related to defects in ciliary assembly and function. It has been exciting to watch a discovery made in the basic cell biology of flagella of a green alga, Chlamydomonas, provide important new information about human diseases.
What do you think are exciting problems in your research area?
You mean, what would I really like to know? For one, how do both primary (nonmotile) and motile cilia, which have a host of specific channels and receptors on their membranes, act as sensory organelles, and how do they send the signals they receive from the environment back to the cell body? Is intraflagellar transport directly involved in this signalling? We have new data that suggests it might be.
How do the multitude of intraflagellar transport polypeptides actually function? For example, at the flagellar tip, how do the intraflagellar transport particles switch their motors from kinesin to dynein, unload their cargo of flagellar precursor proteins, and pick up new cargo from turnover at the tip to return it to the cell body, with hardly a pause? If one watches the rapidity of the process, it is hard to imagine so much going on at the tip. Yet there are structures there, stuck into the ends of the microtubules, initially discovered by my student Bill Dentler in 1977, that no one knows anything about.
Is it more than a coincidence that the primary cilia in many cells in G0/G1 phase resorb before the cell can complete cell divisiondoes cell division depend in some way on cilia resorption? What controls cilia/flagellar length, and why does the cell specifically upregulate only the genes for ciliary proteins ( In Hardin's essay, a 'commons' is an unregulated public pasture on which citizens of a town can graze their livestock. It is in each citizen's best interest to add another animal to graze on the commons even though the reduction in forage harms the herd as a whole. The inexorable ratcheting up of the herd on the pasture eventually leads to overgrazing and the destruction of the commons. This parable reflects the propensity of people to over-utilize and eventually deplete any unregulated public resource whether it be land, clean air, or fish in the ocean. The idea is simple, yet radical: we humans will not act for the common good when it comes to matters of resource use or the environment and will instead do what is best for ourselves as individuals. This selfishness inevitably leads to a tragedy of environmental degradation, overexploitation, and over-population.
Hardin saw only two possible positive outcomes of this tragedy: privatization and private ownership of pastureland, which might yield sound management in selfinterest, or alternatively government ownership and regulation of such resources. If we look around the world today, these are indeed the approaches most often proposed for resource management problems.
Hardin had no faith in the ability of humans to do the right thing for the public good and championed instead, "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon". It seems very natural to expect the worst of humans and lament our greed as the source of so many environmental problems. For example, we need strict fishing regulations because it is in the interest of each individual fisherman to catch as many fish as possible, even as stocks are declining due to overfishing. On Easter Island an entire culture fell into cannibalism and selfannihilation after the last tree was cut down [2] -but the man who cut down the tree to make the last canoe probably had an advantage as long as he lived.
And when conservationists are not arguing for stronger environmental regulations they do analyses and write papers trying to show, in fact, that protecting biodiversity is in our self-interest. Economic valuation studies are designed to show the payoff to conservation. The idea is that if only we all appreciated how biodiversity improves our own personal lot in life, then there would be selfish motivation to reduce the many threats that drive species toward extinction.
In short, everyone seems to have accepted the one basic premise of Hardin's seminal paper: ethical values and conscience simply will not work as a foundation for a sound environment. Hardin wrote, "Ruin is the destination towards which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all".
Despite its enormous influence and visceral appeal, the tragedy of the commons has two undercurrents that the conservation movement sweeps under the rug. First, a key conclusion that Hardin drew was that we must restrict the freedom to reproduce because the tragedy of the commons will inevitably lead to overpopulation. He felt that only by relinquishing the freedom to breed could other 'more precious freedoms' be preserved. It is conspicuous how virtually all international conservation NGO's, and all international conservation agreements steer clear of discussing the regulation of reproductive rights for the sake of population control.
In fact, population growth and population control, which unarguably are core to many environmental threats, remain at the fringes of biodiversity and conservation discussions. Global warming is probably the environmental threat that has most caused environmental thinkers to question how much can be accomplished by regulations alone [4] . International agreements such as the Montreal Protocol, which curbed the use of ozone-depleting chemicals, were wildly successful because the reduction of the ozone layer led to increased incidence of human cancer. In general, cleaning up the airs and waters of the world was an easy sell because of the connection to human health. But biodiversity and climate change are not so easily linked to human self-interest. Certainly there are connectionsbut the connections can be pretty tenuous, and the sacrifices required to halt global warming or prevent species extinctions are substantial and will be painful for some sectors. Conservationists like to pitch win-win solutions [5] ; although these solutions exist they can be very hard to achieve.
Thus using self-interest to rationalize and build support for resource restrictions and biodiversity protection has limitations. The fact is we have not had much success addressing large-scale environmental degradation such as global warming or massive habitat destruction. The treaties and political agreements that get approved lack teeth, and enforcement is nonexistent.
In direct contradiction to Hardin's scoffing at moral authority, Paul and Anne Ehrlich [6] recently argued that the scale of our environmental problems demand that we change attitudes and values, as well as strengthen government regulations. Whereas Hardin argued that environmental morality could never be enough and instead coercion was necessary, the Ehrlichs argue that coercion by itself will not work unless there is a commitment to changing social attitudes. They also reject the charge that such a call for attitude shifts is naïve. The tragedy of the commons is a powerful essay. It is now essentially a platitude that appears in the majority of introductory biological and environmental textbooks. Unfortunately, in the process of being canonized in our textbooks, the tragedy of the commons has escaped the arena of public debate. It is an idea with merit. No one would argue that we abandon regulation and legislation as a tool for environmental policy. But discussions about restricting certain behaviors -especially reproduction, which is arguably the behavior most in need of restriction -have been avoided, simply because they are too politically sensitive. And the very assumption that regulation is sufficiently effective is now being challenged. In the next fifty years, the success of the environmental movement may depend much more on its ability to change ethics and values, than its ability to lobby for the Kyoto agreement. Some might argue that the real tragedy would be if we were to give up so easily on the potential benefits of changing societal attitudes and values.
